Adrian PerezandClaude Opus 4.7
8757de0c36
Pre-push audit agent A2 flagged two HIGH-severity security issues that would have shipped in the PR had we not checked: 1. PUT /api/scenes/[id] URL-validation bypass. Phase 8 P4 fixed the POST /api/scenes route by replacing a loose z.unknown() graph schema with AnyNode superRefine. The fix never made it to the PUT handler - an attacker could resubmit the same javascript:/file:/// payloads via PUT. Fixed by extracting the tight validator into apps/editor/lib/graph-schema.ts and sharing it across both routes. 2. SSRF in photo_to_scene / analyze_floorplan_image / analyze_room_photo. All three tools called raw fetch(image) on user-supplied URLs with no validation - a direct http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ exfil primitive on any cloud host. Added packages/mcp/src/lib/safe-fetch.ts that: - Blocks loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1) - Blocks link-local incl. cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16) - Blocks private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, fc00::/7) - Blocks .local/.internal/.corp hostnames + localhost variants - Blocks v4-mapped IPv6 loopback (::ffff:127.0.0.1) - Manual redirects (max 3), revalidating the allowlist per hop - 20 MB response-size cap (streamed, enforced per-chunk) - 10s timeout - Optional PASCAL_ALLOWED_ASSET_ORIGINS env allowlist Tests: 8 new SSRF guard tests, all vision tests still pass, full suite 302/302. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
35 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
35 lines
1.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { AnyNode } from '@pascal-app/core/schema'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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/**
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* Validates a SceneGraph at an untrusted API boundary. Re-runs
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* `AnyNode.safeParse` on every node, which enforces the `AssetUrl`
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* allowlist in core (closes the Phase 3 SSRF / arbitrary-URL risk on
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* scan/guide/item/material fields).
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*
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* Shared between `POST /api/scenes` and `PUT /api/scenes/[id]` so neither
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* route can silently accept malicious URLs via the `graph` payload.
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*
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* Phase 8 P4 found the POST bypass; Phase 10 A2 found the PUT bypass.
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*/
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export const apiGraphSchema = z
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.object({
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nodes: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),
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rootNodeIds: z.array(z.string()),
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collections: z.unknown().optional(),
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})
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.superRefine((value, ctx) => {
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for (const [nodeId, node] of Object.entries(value.nodes)) {
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const res = AnyNode.safeParse(node)
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if (!res.success) {
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for (const issue of res.error.issues) {
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ctx.addIssue({
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code: 'custom',
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path: ['nodes', nodeId, ...issue.path],
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message: issue.message,
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})
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}
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}
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}
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})
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