Pre-push audit agent A2 flagged two HIGH-severity security issues that
would have shipped in the PR had we not checked:
1. PUT /api/scenes/[id] URL-validation bypass. Phase 8 P4 fixed
the POST /api/scenes route by replacing a loose z.unknown() graph
schema with AnyNode superRefine. The fix never made it to the PUT
handler - an attacker could resubmit the same javascript:/file:///
payloads via PUT. Fixed by extracting the tight validator into
apps/editor/lib/graph-schema.ts and sharing it across both routes.
2. SSRF in photo_to_scene / analyze_floorplan_image /
analyze_room_photo. All three tools called raw fetch(image) on
user-supplied URLs with no validation - a direct
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ exfil primitive on any
cloud host. Added packages/mcp/src/lib/safe-fetch.ts that:
- Blocks loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
- Blocks link-local incl. cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16)
- Blocks private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, fc00::/7)
- Blocks .local/.internal/.corp hostnames + localhost variants
- Blocks v4-mapped IPv6 loopback (::ffff:127.0.0.1)
- Manual redirects (max 3), revalidating the allowlist per hop
- 20 MB response-size cap (streamed, enforced per-chunk)
- 10s timeout
- Optional PASCAL_ALLOWED_ASSET_ORIGINS env allowlist
Tests: 8 new SSRF guard tests, all vision tests still pass, full
suite 302/302.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
